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FORECASTING WITH MACROECONOMETRIC MODELS:
A REPORT FROM THE TRENCHES1
by Ullrich Heilemann2
Econometric models are a widely used and powerful tool in macroeconomic analysis
and forecasting. Admittedly, their acceptance by the scientific community has had some
hard times during the seventies and eighties: a general decline in the reputation of
macroeconomics, the Lucas critique, and failures of the model community to make their
often opaque practice transparent had left their marks. Closer looks at the criticism,
however, revealed its limited relevance, and the „new/old macroeconomic consensus“
(Blinder, Zarnowitz) of the early 1990s seems to have restored much of the lost credibi-
lity. A lack of transparency, however, still diminishes acceptance and credibility of the
results, at least within the academic community3. The apparent deficit in model transpa-
rency has a number of causes, a major one being the fact that the literature on the prac-
tice of macroeconometric forecasting is still sparse (cf. e.g., Klein, Young 1980,
pp. 75ff., Adams 1986, pp. 106ff.) and, given the new technical opportunities for model
and forecast analysis, it is also somewhat outdated. One explanation for this is that eco-
nomic deliberations in the model industry back such disregard (Daub 1987, pp. 73ff.)
and it may still take some time until the industry realises that transparency is the models'
biggest asset.
This paper describes in detail the production of a macroeconometric forecast,
complementing and enlarging on two earlier papers on the subject (Heilemann 1985,
1990). The model used is the business cycle model of the Rheinisch-Westfälisches In-
stitut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI) which has been applied for forecasting since
1978. The forecast examined is the autumn 1996 forecast for 1996 and 1997. To meet
1 Paper presented in the „Ausschuss für empirische Wirtschaftsforschung und angewandte Ökonome-
trie” at the Annual Conference of the Deutsche Statistische Gesellschaft, Hannover, October 8, 1999.
Previous versions of the paper were presented in seminars at the Universität Leipzig and at the Uni-
versität Bielefeld. The financial support of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (SFB 475, „Reduc-
tion of complexity in multivariate data structures“) is gratefully acknowledged.
2 Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung and Gerhard-Mercator-Universität GH
Duisburg.
3 Policy makers and policy making institutions are less sceptical or simply overcome any doubts by
using a multitude of macro models – beside their own ones (Blinder 1998, pp. 11ff.).
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the criticism of a lack of transparency, the paper transcends the usual framework by
analysing the accuracy of the forecast in detail. While forecasts once used to start with
such an examination, not many resources are committed to this nowadays (for what is
still an outstanding example of a forecast analysis, cf. Sapir 1949; the difficulties of er-
ror analysis in not-model based forecasts is illustrated in Fintzen, Steker 1999; for the
routine examination of the RWI-model forecast, see for example Rheinisch-
Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (Hrsg.) 1998, pp. 17ff.).
The fact that this paper is being presented at the annual conference of the Deut-
sche Statistische Gesellschaft calls for two remarks, both related to Karl-Heinz Raabe
(1974). Firstly, the Statistische Gesellschaft has a tradition of dealing with the practical
side and problems of economic forecasting (e.g., Stäglin 1998, Seidler 1975), questions
which are usually ignored in textbooks as well as in methodical tracts. I hope to demon-
strate the importance of the subject in the following. The second remark concerns an
important part of what Raabe termed „empirische Analyse mit sukzessiver Annäherung“
– or the „iterative VGR Prognose“ [iterative NA forecast]. The paper will show that this
iterative approach has much in common with the econometric model approach in a lite-
ral as well as in a general sense. Probably the iterative approach in the latter sense is
characteristic of any forecast. It definitely was part of the mathematical (!) astrologers’
method (Grafton 1999, pp. 162ff.) and will also be part of any autoregressive time series
models used for detailed macroeconomic forecasts.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section (I) displays the analytical
foundations of econometric forecasting and error analysis. Section II briefly presents the
model used and the macroeconomic situation in late 1996. The process of producing the
forecast is described in section III, including the ex post evaluation and the exploration
of the size and nature of its forecasting errors. The paper ends with a summary and con-
clusions (IV). The subtitle of the paper announces a report from the trenches and I hope
you forgive me that the paper is rather dense and brief, and, equally important, that I
abstain from generalisations. History may be made in the trenches but it is written in the
study.
I. Analytical foundations
A simplified form of an econometric model can be represented as follows:
(1) ( )e;;x,x;y,yfy tjttittt β= −−
where:
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)f...,,(ff N1= : vector of N functional relationships;
ty : vector of N endogenous variables;
i-ty : vector of lagged endogenous variables, 1 ≤ i ≤ m;
tx : vector of exogenous variables;
j-tx : vector of lagged exogenous variables, 1 ≤ j ≤ n;
)ß,...,(ßß N1= : matrix of estimated structural parameters;
te : vector of error terms (with the usual assumptions).
Forecasts with this system of equations are made by inserting the predetermined (exo-
genous and lagged endogenous) variables, assuming 0et = and solving the model for
the periods 02 > :
(2) ( )β= +−++−++ ;x,x;y,yfy kjtktkitktkt .
With rare exceptions, macroeconometric models are nonlinear and interdepen-
dent and have to be solved by iteration methods such as the Gauss-Seidel or the Newton-
Raphson method. However, given the capacity of modern computers and the more or
less linear reactions of most models, this no longer poses a problem.
For a number of reasons this basic scheme of econometric forecasting is (usual-
ly) modified: there may be, first, actual data or superior outside estimates available for
some of the endogenous variables to replace model estimates4; second, policy measures
intended for which the model lacks the appropriate instruments (exogenous variables);
third, an equation may be misspecified, may have systematic bias etc., so that the as-
sumption 0  et = for the forecast period appears as unreasonable and is replaced. All this
leads to a broadening of the basic forecasting scheme:
(3) ( )β= ++++−++ ;x;x,x;y,yfy ktakj-tktkitktkt
where:
jtax + : vector of supplements to the absolute term;
or, more specifically:
4 For example, in Germany the annual negotiated wage rate can be reliably predicted from the wage
settlements of the first four to five months of the year; bridge equations (Greene, Howrey, Hymans
1986, pp. 97ff.) or survey data like consumer sentiment indices may be used to exploit their informa-
tional content for superior estimates of the first data of the forecasting period, e.g., in the price sector.
- 4 -
RWI – Heilemann\Hannover\Hannover.doc – 14.12.99
(4) ( )β= +++−++−++ ;x;xx,x;y,yfy ktskto;kjtktkitktkt
where:
kt
ox + : vector of supplements on account of a priori information or „objective con-
siderations” (Intriligator, Bodkin, Hsiao 1996, p. 520) on economic policy,
data etc.
jtsx + : vector of supplement on account of misspecification („subjective considera-
tions”).
These additions are made in various stages of the forecasting process. While the
first ones are usually made at its start, the second ones are typically made in later stages,
in particular when the results contradict macroeconomic reasoning or outside informati-
on. All this makes the process of forecasting to an iterative procedure similar - though to
a much smaller extent and, of course, much quicker - to the procedures of the so-called
informal GDP model forecasts (for Germany see e.g. Raabe 1974; general: Zarnowitz
1992, pp. 385ff.). Usually, the modifications are made in the form of additions to the
constant term („adds“) so that the basic model reactions are not disturbed. Of course,
other („reaction“-)parameters could also be changed, but this would make the results
much more difficult to control.
II. The RWI short term model
The RWI-business cycle model is a medium-sized, quarterly model, which has been
used for short-term forecasting (six to eight quarters) and simulation since the late
1970s. The version examined here consists of 41 stochastic equations and 86 identities,
which together form an interdependent („DID-type”), weakly non-linear model (details
on this and the following: Heilemann 1998; for a listing of a current equation system,
see Heilemann, Barabas 1996, pp. 429ff.). In macroeconomic perspective, it can be par-
titioned into five sectors: origin (5 stochastic equations; 17 definitions), demand (8; 24),
prices (8; 12), income distribution (6; 13), and government (14; 20). The list of exoge-
nous variables includes policy-determined variables, such as the Social Security Contri-
bution Rate, Government Construction Outlays, and Interest Rates on the one hand, and
internationally determined variables, such as World Trade (volume index) and Import
Prices, on the other hand. The theoretical foundations of the equations are, as for most
applied econometric models, somewhat eclectic, including neo-classical and Keynesian,
as well as monetarist elements. The architecture of the model, however, is in the Key-
nes/Klein tradition. With respect to the roles played by demand and money (interest ra-
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tes) and the stability of the private sector, the model may be labelled as post-Keynesian,
or, with respect to the relevance of monetary factors, to fiscal and monetary „shocks“, to
the supply side elasticity, to the symmetrical reaction of the (modified) Phillips curve, to
the reactions of wages to changes of macroeconomic demand or to „rational“ price ex-
pectations,  as a „new/old consensus“-model (Blinder 1992, pp. 191ff.).
The model is re-estimated twice a year from seasonal unadjusted data; the
sample period is the same for all equations and, to omit cyclical bias, covers only the
last 40 quarters of the data available („moving window“). For the current study the
sample period is 1986-3 to 1996-2, with West German data up to 1990-2, and thereafter
all German data with a number of one time and permanent dummy variables in most
equations.5 The parameters are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). As a sector-
ordered incidence matrix reveals, the model, like most others models of this size, has
comparatively few within-block and between-block relationships, and the former are
more numerous than the latter. Even with this kind of ordering the blocks are more or
less recursive.
The model’s forecasting accuracy has been widely examined and is part of the
published spring forecasts with the model (e.g. Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für
Wirtschaftsforschung (Hrsg.) 1998, p. 17), ex post and ex ante, in general as well as in
particular situations. It was seen as not being outside expectations based on ex post per-
formance and of macroeconomic forecasts in general.
With regard to the intention of the present study, it should be emphasised that in
terms of the general structure of the model, the specification of the single equations and
their selection, the model is very much short-term oriented: the supply side is, so to spe-
ak, recursive to demand and not restricted by the (given) production potential; the
sample period reflects only the last two cycles and the selection of specifications is ma-
de with the eight quarters forecast horizon in mind. The model's long-term properties
and its determinants are of interest but as with most short-run models the impact and
interim multipliers are of greater importance (Thomas 1995, p. 405).
III. The 1997 forecast
The process of forecasting with econometric models is, like macroeconomic forecasting
in general, both a recursive and an interdependent process. Usually it takes several
5 A complete listing of equations, estimation results etc. (model-version no. 44) is available from the
RWI upon request.
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Table 1
Forecast accuracy1 of the exogenous variables
1996 and 1997
1996 1997 ave-
rage2
Public construction outlays, a 10,7 10,1 4,8
rates of change b 8,7 8,7 4,0
c 6,7 8,7 2,8
d 1,1 6,8 1,5
Social security, contribution a -0,5 -0,3 0,2
rates b 0,0 -0,1 0,1
c 0,1 0,1 0,1
d 0,1 0,1 0,1
World exports (volume index) a 1,0 -2,3 1,8
1980=100, rates of change b 1,0 -2,2 1,4
c -0,2 -2,8 1,1
d 0,3 -1,7 0,5
Price index of imports, a 2,2 -0,9 2,9
rates of change b 0,9 -1,6 2,4
c 0,0 -1,3 0,9
d -0,4 0,4 0,4
Short term interest rate, a 1,2 0,8 1,1
percent b 0,8 0,0 0,6
c -0,2 -0,1 0,5
d -0,1 0,0 0,0
Long term interest rate, a 1,3 1,2 0,8
percent b 0,7 0,7 0,6
c 0,3 0,3 0,3
d 0,1 0,0 0,1
Source: Heilemann 1998, p. 85 and own computations. It mean: a: spring forecast of the
year anteceding; b: autumn forecast of the year anteceding; c: spring forecast of the cur-
rent year, d: autumn forecast of the current year. - 1) Forecast minus actual data. -
2) Average of absolute differences 1981-3 to 1997-4.
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rounds until the final forecast is reached. Here, the process is broken up into five stages:
(1) examination of the previous forecast; (2) structural analysis of the newly estimated
model; (3) survey of the starting conditions and the setting of the exogenous variables
and assumptions; (4) production of the forecast proper; (5) „after the fact“ evaluation of
the forecast.
(1) Examination of the previous forecast
The examination of the previous forecast (made in spring 1997, covering 1996-1 to
1997-4) is basically the same as what will be done later under (5) so it can be kept brief
here. As tables 1, 2 and 4 (see below) disclose, the assumptions for the exogenous va-
riables for 1996 were pretty accurate, while at least some of those for 1997 showed con-
siderable errors (compared with their long term average): Public Construction Outlays
and Interest Rates were overestimated, while the international development (World Tra-
de, Import Prices) was much underestimated. Though the error of the original forecast
of GDP (rate of growth) with 0.6 percentage points is much below the usual error (1.0),
correcting for faulty assumptions (table 4, below), increases it to 1.2 percent, mainly as
a consequence of the reduced compensation of the errors with Private Consumption and
Fixed Investment by those of Exports.6 All in all, the forecast accuracy of the spring
forecast was unusually high, though not exactly for the right reasons.
(2) Structural analysis of the newly estimated model
The second phase starts with the inspection of the estimation results for single equations
in a structural analysis. It comprises all 41 stochastic equations and all parameters - re-
action parameters as well as statistics. The results are examined from a long range per-
spective (moving 40 quarters-windows), thus lowering the importance of temporary
deteriorations in the econometric/statistical quality of the equations. Of course, given
the few innovations possible with a two quarter shift of the moving window, the chan-
ges which turn up are usually rather small. As an example of this kind of examination,
the figure presents elasticities, 2R , DW statistic, explanatory contributions, beta-
coefficients) for the Private Consumption function from 1960 to 1989 (subsequent data
suffer in substance from the economic effects of German unification in West Germany
and in quality from the statistical consequences of European integration (e.g., intra-EU
trade)). The inspection of the estimation results with the new data did not reveal any
6 As set out below, this kind of statement, though very popular, is formally not correct.
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Figure
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
2
1
0
2.5
2.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
0
Stability of the Private Consumption Function (CP91)
1960 to 19891
Real disposable income (YPV91)
Long-term interest rate (ZINSL)
Private consumption, real (CP91(-1))
Dynamic, single equation, out of-sample period forecast:
Parameter
Standardised (Beta-)coefficients
8-quarter-percentage mean error
Elasticity
Statistics
8-quarter-RMSPE
Specification
CP91 = c(1)*YPV91+c(2)*ZINSL+c(3)*CP91(-1)+c(4)*DS+c(5)*DS1+c(6)*DS2+c(7)
significant (5%) long-term elasticity
DW-statistics
not-significant short-term elasticity
adjusted R2
0.8 1.5
0.8 0.8
1.5
0.05
0.6 1.0
0.6 0.6
1.0
0
0.2
0.2 0.2
0
-0.5
-0.10
-0.15
0.4
0.5
0.4 0.4
0.5
-0.05
0 0
0 0
1
0
-1
-2
YPV91 ZINSL
CP91(-1)
65 6569 6971 7173 7375 7567 6777 7779 7981 8183 83
Author's computations. – Moving 40-quarters window.1
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Table 2
Forecast accuracy1 of the endogenous variables
1996 and 1997, rates of change
Exogenous variables
estimated actual
1996 1997 ave-
rage2
1996 1997 ave-
rage2
Employed, a 1047 1117 549 843 1226 534
in 1000 b 828 962 417 728 975 486
c 372 434 212 375 190
d 128 57 130 118 141
Private consumption, a 1,8 1,4 0,8 0,9 1,7 0,8
real b 1,9 1,9 0,8 1,7 1,7 0,8
c 1,8 0,4 0,6 1,6 0,7
d 0,8 0,0 0,3 0,5 0,3
Fixed investment, a 4,4 2,6 3,4 -0,2 1,8 2,5
real b 3,7 4,4 2,7 -0,5 5,4 2,2
c -2,0 5,0 1,9 -1,6 1,5
d 0,0 0,9 0,7 -1,0 0,9
Exports, real4 a 0,5 -4,9 3,4 0,1 -2,8 1,6
b 1,3 -3,4 2,6 0,7 -0,6 1,6
c -1,4 -3,5 2,1 -1,1 1,7
d -0,8 -1,3 0,6 -0,7 0,8
GNP, real4 a 1,6 0,0 1,2 0,2 0,2 0,8
b 1,5 0,6 1,0 0,3 1,2 0,7
c -0,1 0,2 0,5 0,0 0,5
d 0,3 -0,2 0,2 0,0 0,3
Deflator Private consumption a -0,2 -0,2 0,4 -0,1 -0,7 0,4
b -0,1 -0,3 0,3 -0,5 -0,5 0,3
c -0,5 -0,9 0,3 -0,6 0,2
d -0,2 0,0 0,1 -0,2 0,1
Government deficit, a 48,4 -26,1 25,5 55,0 -19,9 26,1
bill. DM b 62,0 -24,1 33,0 38,9 -26,1 32,1
c -4,0 -11,1 25,2 -10,8 24,5
d 2,0 -24,1 7,5 -9,2 5,0
Source: Heilemann 1998, pp. 87, 89 and own computations. It mean: a: spring forecast of the year an-
teceding; b: autumn forecast of the year anteceding; c: spring forecast of the current year, d: autumn
forecast of the current year. - 1) Forecast minus actual data. - 2) Average of absolute differences 1981-
3 to 1997-4.
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Table 3
Expost forecasting accuracy of the RWI-model forecast for 1996/97
In-sample1 Out-of-sample2
RMSPE RMSPE Annual absolute error
1987-3/1996-2 1996-3/1997-4 1996 1997
Type of model solution:
36 quarters 6*6 quarters 6 quarters
Single equati-
on
Static si-
mulation
Dynamic Dynamic
GDP, origin
Wage and salary earners – 0,3 0,4 2,4 0,5 2,3
Productivity per hour – 0,7 0,7 3,6 -0,1 -1,4
GDP, real – 0,7 0,7 1,5 0,1 1,1
Demand, real
Private consumption 0,4 0,9 1,0 1,7 0,5 1,4
Government consumption 1,1 1,1 1,1 1,1 -0,4 0,0
Gross fixed capital formation – 1,7 1,7 5,3 -0,6 5,1
 Machinery 4,1 3,2 3,6 6,4 -0,6 7,5
 Construction – 1,4 1,4 4,9 -0,6 3,6
 Non-residential building 2,3 2,4 2,4 12,9
 Housing 2,1 2,1 2,1 4,0
Change in inventories, in bill. DM 3,7 2 4,2 2 4,4 2 4,1 2 7,5 -13,5
Net exports, in bill.DM – 4,5 2 4,7 2 4,5 2 -4,0 -8,0
 Exports 1,7 1,7 1,8 2,5 -1,0 -0,6
 Imports 1,2 2,2 2,2 0,9 -0,1 -0,2
GDP – 0,7 0,7 1,5 0,1 1,1
Price deflators, 1991 = 100
Private consumption 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,6 -0,2 -0,6
GDP – 0,4 0,4 0,7 0,3 0,0
GDP, income
Income
 Gross wage and salary income – 0,8 0,9 3,0 0,7 2,5
 Gross profits/assets – 4,0 3,9 5,8 -1,5 -2,4
National income – 1,0 1,0 1,7 0,1 1,0
Net wage income
– Depent personal services – 0,9 0,9 3,3 0,7 2,8
– Profits/assets – 4,8 4,7 7,4 -3,0 -2,8
Government
Gross income – 1,1 1,1 1,7 -0,2 1,5
Expenditures – 1,1 1,0 1,7 0,5 1,1
Net financial investment in bill. DM – 5,2 2 4,9 2 5,9 2 -17,3 -14,2
Author‘s computations. – 1)  Root mean square percentage error. – 2) Root mean square error.
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noteworthy changes – neither as to the reactions nor as to the statistical quality of the
equations.
The single equation analysis is followed by an examination of the (complete)
model's static and six quarters dynamic simulation characteristics (table 3). As to be
expected, compared with the single equation results the fit quality of most equations is
much reduced, though in some cases (aggregation) gains are observed (e.g., for Fixed
Investment). Those variables primarily explained by predetermined variables (e.g., Ex-
ports, Distributed Profits, Government Consumption), of course, do not exhibit any dif-
ferences from the single equation results. The differences between the static and the six
quarter dynamic simulation results are small and after four quarters7 both are very much
the same. Although for the data reasons mentioned above the quality of the stochastic
equations had somewhat suffered, the present results gave no cause for respecifications.
Analyses of model multipliers and model elasticities were not made this time, though
they are part of general model inspections.
(3) Survey of the starting conditions and the setting of the exogenous variables and of
other assumptions
The general economic environment had been set out in detail in the autumn Gemein-
schaftsdiagnose [Joint Diagnosis] (Arbeitsgemeinschaft 1996). It may be summarised as
follows: in 1996 the German economy was still in the early phase of a long but weak
upswing, mostly driven by exports. The expansion was slower than usual in this phase
of the cycle which can be attributed to the investment boom during unification, govern-
ment efforts to meet the Maastricht criteria, the aftermaths of a strong Deutschmark and
the rather high real interest rate (see, for example, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für
Wirtschaftsforschung (Hrsg.) 1997, pp. 127ff.).
The values fixed for the exogenous variables were the same as those used for the
RWI model in the Gemeinschaftsdiagnose. Their deviation from the spring forecast with
the model can be seen in table 4 where the values of the previous model forecast and the
new values of exogenous variables are shown under columns A and B (changes of these
new values under the following columns are due to changes in the data base). Major
revisions were made for Public Investment, a consequence of greater attention paid by
policy to the Maastricht criteria, and for the Interest Rate, but only the former were of
particular importance for the economic development within the next 18 months.
7 The RWI-model is a system of difference equations of 15th order but 90 percent of the lags are
within the four quarters range.
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Having fixed the values of the exogenous variables, the forecasting process
could, in principle, start. As laid out before, however, a certain amount of additional
information has to be included. As table 5 reveals, this mostly comprises tax reductions
(ca. 9 bill. DM net) and cuts in government expenditure (about 12 bill. DM). While the
effects of these measures in relation to GDP are not too impressive, their consequences
for the level and structure of government deficit (about 0.3 percent of the GDP/deficit
ratio) are. A stronger intervention is the 0.5 reduction of the Negotiated Wage Rate
(changes against previous year) to 2.2 percent, because of strong evidence that wage
policy could be expected to be much more employment-directed than the model’s func-
tion had suggested (3.5 percent).
Here and in most previous cases the effects of the various policy measures on
short run macroeconomic activity are all in all rather small, rarely exceeding 0.2 percent
of GDP. Given the lags of macroeconomic reactions it could be argued that their obser-
vation and inclusion is not indispensable. In addition, their inclusion is often also arbi-
trary as well as to the measures to be included – those which are discussed in the ruling
parties, or those which have been passed by the cabinet, or those which have been
enacted? – as to the amounts and to the datings. The amounts often pose difficult pro-
blems, e.g. when the government expects revenues from a tax hike without taking the
macroeconomic repercussions into account (as it usually does); the difficulties of the
latter result from the quarterly distribution of the expected extra revenues.8
Nevertheless, for the present model, these „objective considerations” have pro-
ved to be necessary: firstly, because professional readers of the forecast, in particular
when they look beyond GDP or inflation, want to know which policies have been inclu-
ded and how; secondly, even if one tends to ignore most of these measures one has to
examine them first; third, over the years the process of inclusion gives hints as to im-
provements, enlargements and corrections of the model's informational content and ar-
chitecture.
(4) Production of the forecast
The forecast proper starts with a number of test runs to gain an impression of the effects
of the newly set assumptions (here: the exogenous variables, old „adds”). First, the old
model version is re-run with the new assumptions and, second, the new version is run
with old and then with new assumptions. As table 4 displays, the consequences for the
8 Of course, if the model’s tax equations exactly mirrored the tax code, this would not be a problem, but
the tax equations are short cuts in which these kind of changes have to be introduced in rather simple
ways. Happily, after a few periods, the newly estimated equations correct automatically.
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forecast vary: While the new assumptions (table 4, column B) do not change the picture
much, the „new sample period” (1987-3 to 1996-1 with old assumptions) (C) does so to
considerable degree. This does not only hold for real GDP but also, of course, for Em-
ployment, Prices, and the Government Deficit. As to the composition of GDP, the most
important changes are to be registered within the investment and the foreign trade sec-
tion.9
The final, published forecast (new model version, new assumptions, and policy
adds - D) renders a picture of the German economy in 1997 very similar to that shown
in C: a considerable increase of real growth in 1997, mainly to be attributed to Fixed
Investment, including Changes in Stocks and Net exports. Inflation would still be mode-
rate and Employment improves slowly.
Comparing this picture with those of major macroeconomic forecasters, the dif-
ferences are small: The Gemeinschaftsdiagnose, published on October 29, 1996 (Ar-
beitsgemeinschaft 1996), had forecast, based on very similar assumptions, GDP growth
rates of 1.5 percent in 1996 and 2.5 percent in 1997, and inflation rates (consumption
deflator) of 2.0 percent and 1.5 percent; the Sachverständigenrat [Council of Economic
Experts] forecast, published on November 18, 1996, expected the same rates of growth
for real GDP, and 1.75 percent for inflation in 1996 and 1997 (Sachverständigenrat
1997, Ziffer 215ff.); finally, the Jahreswirtschaftsbericht der Bundesregierung [Annual
Economic Report of the Federal Government] issued on January 29, 1997 expected a
real growth of 2.5 percent and an inflation growth of 1.75 percent (Bundesregierung
1997, Ziffer 122ff.).
(5) The evaluation of the forecast
The evaluation starts with a comparison of the forecast with observed data, which in the
present case means the data earliest released by the Statistische Bundesamt [Federal
Statistical Office], here taken from the 1998 spring Gemeinschaftsdiagnose (Arbeitsge-
meinschaft 1998).
The result may appear to be not all too impressive (table 4, columns D, G): the
GDP growth has been missed by 0.6 percentage points, mainly as a consequence of a
gross overestimation of Private Consumption (nearly 2 percentage points) and Fixed
Investment (4.4 percentage points), fortunately partially offset by an even more severe
underestimation of the Changes in Stocks and of Net Exports. The balance for Employ-
9 Since 1998 the check of the various forecasts also includes a cyclical classification of the quarterly
forecast results, cf. Heilemann, Münch 1998. Table 6 (Appendix) reveals that the various forvasts did
hardly affect the picture of a very strong  upswing-phase from 1996-3 to 1997-4.
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Table 5
Modifiying the 1997 forecast for Germany
billion DM
1997 1997
quarter
1 2 3 4
Surplus of Deutsche Bundesbank
 Earned income of government 8,5 – 8,5 – –
Tax reforms
Income taxes on wages and salaries -8,4 -2,1 -2,1 -2,1 -2,1
 Increase of child allowance/benefit -3,8 -1,0 -1,0 -1,0 -1,0
 Abolishment of property tax -5,3 -1,3 -1,3 -1,3 -1,3
 Others 0,7 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2
 Income taxes on enterprise and property
 Abolishment of property tax -3,5 -0,9 -0,9 -0,9 -0,9
Excise and other „indirect“ taxes 1,6 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4
 Reform of motor vehicle tax 2,1 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5
 Abolishment of trade tax on business capital -3,7 -0,9 -0,9 -0,9 -0,9
 Increase of real property transfer tax from 2 to 3 percent 3,2 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,8
 Changes of CPI in percent
 Reform of motor vehicle tax 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1
 Received property transfers
 Amendment of inheritance (gift) tax 1,6 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4
 Personal property/entrepreneurial income
 Amendment of inheritance (gift) tax (by 25vH) 0,4 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1
Balancing the budget
 Government consumption -8,3 -2,1 -2,1 -2,1 -2,1
 Transfers -3,5 -0,9 -0,9 -0,9 -0,9
Other modifications - - - - -
Source: Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (Hrsg.) 1996. Modified variables in italics.
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ment is, of course, even more unpleasant because of an Okun’s Law employment barrier
(1 to 1.5 percent growth of real GDP): instead of an increase, the economy experienced
a further severe drop in employment, so there is also some evidence of a steep increase
of productivity, not uncommon in the early upswing phase of the cycle. The forecasts
for the Deflator of Private Consumption, which grossly overestimated the development
because of both the lower wage settlements and the higher productivity, are equally dis-
appointing. The Government Deficit for 1997 was overestimated by more than 25 per-
cent - certainly an outcome of a number of additional measures to meet the Maastricht
criteria by a more restrained expenditure policy than assumed.10
What are the reasons? First of all it should be noted that though the size of the
errors seems disappointingly high, the errors still lie more or less within the margins
which reasonably could be expected from the ex post performance of the current model
version (table 3) as well as from past ex ante forecasting experience with the model in
general (table 2). It is nevertheless rewarding to look for „exogenous” and „endoge-
nous” reasons for the failures.
It is beyond the possibilities here to look at the causes for these deteriorations of
the single equations in detail, though some reasons or causes are obvious (see „As-
sumptions“ in columns D and E, table 5): the lower construction outlays of the govern-
ment sector, the increases of social security contributions and the much lower wage in-
creases. All in all, policy impulses introduced in the forecast outside exogenous varia-
bles (table 3) amounted to about 10 bill DM, which „reduced” real GDP growth in 1997
by 0.2 percentage points.11
Unfortunately, although this is not totally new or uncommon (see Evans et al.,
pp. 1053ff.; Heilemann 1985, pp. 699ff.), repeating the forecast with observed data for
the exogenous variables (including the negotiated wages)
(5) ( )ß;x,x,x,x; y,yfy ktsktAkj-tktki-tktkt +++++++ =
where
x
A : vector of exogenous variables, actual/observed data.
10 The rate of change of Government Expenditures was overestimated by 2.6 percentage points
(1981/1997 average error: 2.1), Government Revenues by 1.7 (1.5).
11 It is, of course, extremely difficult - if possible in some cases at all - to validate these amounts.
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renders an even more inferior picture (table 5, column E). The GDP forecast for 1997 is
now 1.1 percentage points off the mark! Numerically, this can be attributed to a further
deterioration of the Fixed Investment forecast, which was only partly balanced by im-
provements of the Change of Stocks and Net Exports. The errors of Employment and
Inflation are hardly affected, which is at least in the first case, arguing in an implicit
production function context, somewhat surprising. Although it is beyond the possibili-
ties here to look at the causes for these deteriorations of the single equations in detail,
some deliberations on this will follow in a moment.
Before presenting these, the results up to now should be compared with those for
competing forecasts. Unfortunately, the Gemeinschaftsdiagnose abstains from analysing
its forecasting accuracy and the forecast analysis of the Sachverständigenrat (1997,
p. 157) is not very specific on this. Restricted to GDP and the Deflator for Private Con-
sumption, the (real) GDP forecasts of 2.5 percent [rounded] of both the Gemeinschafts-
diagnose and of the Sachverständigenrat showed an error of 0.3 [0.5 rounded], while the
error of the model was 0.6 (D). As to inflation, the Gemeinschaftsdiagnose and Sachver-
ständigenrat expected an increase in the Deflator for Private Consumption of 1.5 percent
and 1.75 percent respectively, while the model forecast was 1.6 percent and the actual
value 1.9 percent. Alas, the forecasts of the Gemeinschaftsdiagnose and of the Sachver-
ständigenrat – certainly a major shortcoming of the „informal GDP model” – cannot be
corrected for flaws in their assumptions. Assuming that both were based on similar as-
sumptions as the model forecast, which certainly holds for the Gemeinschaftsdiagnose,
previous ranking would not be affected. In any case, the two informal forecasts as well
as the two model forecasts lie well within the margins set by past experiences (Heile-
mann 1998a, pp. 84ff., Heilemann 1998b, pp. 86ff.). A performance which may be re-
spected more if we take account of the various policies to meet the Maastricht criteria
which were not allowed for in the exogenous variables.
Given the performance as the model with actual values for the exogenous variables,
some lessons for the forecast accuracy of the various variables seem at hand. However,
given the simultaneous and recursive links between macroeconomic variables, in parti-
cular the former, one has to be careful with determining their forecast rank or of the size
of their errors.12 Although these difficulties could be reduced by subsequent exogeniza-
tion of endogenous variables, this is beyond the scope of this paper. What seems ob-
vious is that the unusually large forecast errors for Private Consumption and for Fixed
12 Formally speaking, multivariate/multiperiod macroeconomic forecasts are „konjunktive Prognosen
[associated forecasts]“, even those of VAR models (definitions!).
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Investment were responsible for a large part of the GDP errors. To illustrate just this
point: an exogenization of Private Consumption reduced the 1997 GDP forecast from
3.3 to 2.5 percent, though the accuracy gains were, of course, not equally distributed
within the model, and some variables such as Net Exports or Change in Stocks even
experienced deteriorations – underscoring the compound character of macroeconomic
forecasts.
Some lessons about changes in economic reactions can be learned from the ex
post forecast 1988-1 to 1997-4, i.e. including the forecast period. The accuracy for this
simulation (table 5, column F) has greatly improved, and Private Consumption and Fi-
xed Investment in particular are now nearly perfectly met. The same holds true for the
forecasts of Inflation, Employment, distribution and even the Government Deficit. This
indicates that there may have been some small changes in the economic reactions as
represented by the behavioural equations, underlining the need to use as up to date a
sample period as possible, and in doing so to validate the use of the moving window
technique (more on this in Barabas, Heilemann, Münch 1994 with the RWI-model).
Could we have done better? Of course, there are infinite ways to improve fore-
casts with hindsight. Restricted to the present model version, an exploration the possibi-
lities of exploiting the information content of residuals suggests itself.
The exploitation of past error structures for forecasts has a long tradition in
macroeconometric forecasting13. A widely known pattern is the Cochrane-Orcutt (CO)
correction of parameters to eliminate serial correlation in the residuals (see for example
Intriligator, Bodkin, Hsiao 1996, pp. 140f.). Correcting all equations with the exceptions
of Private Consumption, Negotiated Wage Rate, and Depreciation where signs of para-
meters had changed, resulted, however, only in marginal improvements of the forecast
accuracy: The GDP-error decreased by 0.1 percentage points and that of the Govern-
ment Deficit by 1.5 bill DM.
Some remarks on the time and cost framework of the econometric model forecasts. Gi-
ven the model, the preparation of the forecast as described here takes about two person
weeks (net). It started on October, 7 and the final forecast (Rheinisch-Westfälisches
Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (Hrsg.) 1996a) was issued on November 13, 1996. It
should, however, be noted that the production can draw heavily on in-house expertise as
to the evaluation of the data and their possible flaws, the fixing of the exogenous varia-
13 For some time in the 1970s it was also used by the Deutsche Bundesbank in its semi-annual model,
though over the years the results seem to have been not all too impressive and CO-correction was
dropped (Heilemann 1981, pp. 89ff.).
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bles and the additional policy assumptions, and, of course, as to the general economic
environment and the future picture of the economy as set out in our bi-annual reports.
The costs of this and of the forecast proper add up to about 10,000 DM.
IV. Summary and conclusions
The paper demonstrates that forecasting with a medium sized macroeconometric model
in practice is a multistage, interdependent process. It requires not only the inclusion of a
mass of outside information on exogenous and also endogenous variables - in this re-
spect it is not all too different from what has to be performed within the informal GDP
model approach. Generalisations on this practice, sometimes termed as art or tender
loving care (tlc), however, are difficult to establish, given the very different scope of
macroeconomic models and their diverse predispositions for this kind of interference.
With respect to accuracy, the model’s 1997 forecast of real GDP and of Inflation
is somewhat less accurate than rival forecasts by the Gemeinschaftsdiagnose or by the
Sachverständigenrat. However, the differences are small and do not affect the general
picture of a moderate upswing in 1997. In particular, the consequences for economic
policy would not have been affected either by the differences between the various fore-
cast errors or by their magnitudes.
Though the errors are of regrettable size, it should be realised that they are well
within the margins that could reasonably be expected from past experience. As the re-
run of the forecast with the actual values for exogenous variables reveals, wrong as-
sumptions, in particular for the 1997 Public Construction Outlays, World Trade and
Long Term Interest Rates, are mostly responsible for the forecast errors; unfortunately
there are not only 1st type errors but also those of the 2nd type such as the over-
estimating of the consequences of Maastricht consolidation for Government Consumpti-
on. But, of course, proper endogenous errors are to be registered too, though they seem
to outweigh each other: over-estimating of Imports and over-estimating of Changes of
Stocks. It may be, however, somewhat consoling that the Gemeinschaftsdiagnose and
the Sachverständigenrat erred with similar magnitudes - not only with respect to GDP,
but also with respect to the structure of the forecast of the demand side. However, time
is a great consoler I am afraid. The next generation of PhD students measuring forecast
accuracy on the base of the recent release of NA data with the new NA concept (ESA
95) will find that the 1997 GDP forecasts were off the mark so much (September 1999:
1.5 percent!) that it is time for a basic overhaul of GDP forecasting techniques and eco-
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nomic theory. Though this would be a wrong judgement, let them try! (they will do it
anyway.)
From a methodical perspective, the paper was intended to demonstrate the rich
possibilities of macroeconometric model analysis – ex post and ex ante. As to ex ante or
structural analysis, the technical progress over the last decade has facilitated this greatly:
the examination of equation stability or multiplier checks are now a matter of minutes.
With regard to ex post analysis, in principle it would be preferable to leave this to third
parties - as in the ESRC Macroeconomic Modelling Bureau project for forecast analysis
in the UK (Wallis (ed.) 1985). Given the importance of this kind of analysis for the pro-
duction of new forecasts and the usual publication delay with third parties’ reports, it
has to be an indispensable part of any model forecast. Finally, though most of the prac-
tice shown here is limited to the econometric model approach, informal forecast me-
thods (GDP model) could perform some of it, too. It should not be completely ruled out
that one might even learn from practice. Putting it in an other way, and referring to the
paper by Raabe a last time here, the macroeconometric model approach can do eve-
rything every other approach can. Of course, not every step can claim the reputation of
econometrics and this paper shows that there is still a lot to be done. Unfortunately, the
principal transparency of the econometric model approach one of its main assets, does
not have a high priority in the forecasting community. This was already the case with
16th century astrologers (Grafton 1999, pp. 130ff.) and there is not much evidence that
it will change in the next century.
- 21 -
RWI – Heilemann\Hannover\Hannover.doc – 14.12.99
Literature
Adams, F.G.: The business forecasting revolution. Nation - industry - firm. New York,
Oxford 1986.
Arbeitsgemeinschaft deutscher wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Forschungsinstitute e.V.,
München: Die Lage der Weltwirtschaft und der deutschen Wirtschaft im Herbst
1996. Beurteilung der Wirtschaftslage durch die folgenden Mitglieder: DIW, Ifo,
IfW, IWH und RWI. Berlin 1996.
Arbeitsgemeinschaft deutscher wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Forschungsinstitute e.V.,
München: Die Lage der Weltwirtschaft und der deutschen Wirtschaft im Frühjahr
1998. Beurteilung der Wirtschaftslage durch die folgenden Mitglieder: DIW, Ifo,
IfW, IWH und RWI. Berlin 1998.
Barabas, G., Heilemann, U., Münch, H.J.: Forecasting accuracy and the length of the
sample period - Selection problems in a macroeconometric model context. (RWI-
Papiere, 34.) Essen 1994.
Blinder, A.S.: Comment: Déjà vu all over again. In: M.T. Belongia and M.R. Garfinkel
(eds.), The business cycle: theories and evidence. Proceedings of the Sixteenth an-
nual Economic Policy Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Boston
1992, pp. 189-196.
Blinder, A.S.: Central banking in theory and in practice. Cambridge, MA, 1998.
Bundesregierung: Jahreswirtschaftsbericht 1997 der Bundesregierung. BT-Drucksache,
13/3601 vom 31.1.1997.
Daub, M.: Canadian economic forecasting - In a world where all's unsure. Kingston and
Montreal 1987.
Evans, M.K., Haitovsky, Y., Treyz., G.I. and Su, V.: An analysis of the forecasting Pro-
perties of U.S. econometric models. In: B.G. Hickman (ed.), Econometric models of
cyclical behaviour. (Studies in Income and Wealth, 36.) New York, NY 1972, vol.
II, pp. 949-1139.
Fintzen, D., Stekler, O.: Why did forecasters fail to predict the 1990 recession? Interna-
tional Journal of Forecasting, 15 (1999), pp. 309-323.
Grafton, A.: Die Welten und Werke eines Renaissance Astrologen. [The worlds and
works of a renaissance-astrologer.] Berlin 1999 [Cambridge, MA 1999]
Greene, M.N., Howrey, E.P., Hymans, S.H.: The use of outside informtion in econome-
tric forecasting. In: D. Belsley, E. Kuh (eds.), Model reliability. Cambridge, MA
1986, pp. 90 - 116.
Heilemann, U.: Zur Prognoseleistung ökonometrischer Konjunkturmodelle für die Bun-
desrepublik Deutschland. (Schriftenreihe des Rheinisch-Westfälischen Instituts für
Wirtschaftsforschung, N.F. Heft 44.) Berlin 1981.
Heilemann, U.: Zur Prognosepraxis ökonometrischer Modelle. Zeitschrift für Wirt-
schafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Berlin, 105. Jg. (1985), pp. 683-708.
- 22 -
RWI – Heilemann\Hannover\Hannover.doc – 14.12.99
Heilemann, U.: Die Prognosen für 1988 im Rückblick: Der Börsenkrach vom 19. Ok-
tober 1987 und seine gesamtwirtschaftlichen Folgen. Kredit und Kapital, 23. Jg.
(1990), pp. 174-195.
Heilemann, U.: Erfahrungen mit dem RWI-Konjunkuturmodell 1974 bis 1994. In: U.
Heilemann und J. Wolters (Hrsg.): Gesamtwirtschaftliche Modelle in der Bundesre-
publik Deutschland: Erfahrungen und Perspektiven. (Schriftenreihe des Rheinisch-
Westfälischen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung, N.F. Heft 61.) Berlin 1998 (a),
pp. 61-93.
Heilemann, U.: Paradigm lost - Zu den Projektionen des Jahreswirtschaftsberichts der
Bunderegierung. In: U. Heilemann, D. Kath, H. Kloten (Hrsg.): Entgrenzung als Er-
kenntnis- und Gestaltungsaufgabe - Festschrift für Reimut Jochimsen zum 65. Ge-
burtstag. Berlin 1998 (b), pp. 79-100.
Heilemann, U., Barabas, G.: Saisonbereinigung und makroökonometrische Modelle:
Befunde mit dem RWI-Konjunkturmodell. Ifo-Studien, 42. Jg. (1996), pp. 403-437.
Heilemann, U., Münch, H.J.: Cyclical classification of the RWI-short term forecast
1997-3 to 1999-4. (SFB 475, Technical Report, 16/98.) Universität Dortmund 1998.
Intriligator, M. D., Bodkin, R.G., Hsiao, C.: Econometric models, Techniques, and
applications. Second Edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ 1996.
Klein, L.R. and Young, R.M.: An introduction to econometric forecasting. Lexington,
MA, and Toronto 1980.
Raabe, K.-H.: Gesamtwirtschaftliche Prognosen und Projektionen als Hilfsmittel der
Wirtschaftspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. AStA, 59. Bd. (1974), pp. 1-
31.
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (Hrsg.), Die wirtschaftliche
Lage im Ausland. RWI-Konjunkturbericht (1997), pp. 101-121.
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (Hrsg.): Vierteljährliche Pro-
gnose mit dem RWI-Konjunkturmodell 1996-3 bis 1997-4, Nr. 44. (Bearbeiter: Dr.
György Barabas, Ullrich Taureg) Essen, 13. November 1996.
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (Hrsg.): Vierteljährliche Pro-
gnose mit dem RWI-Konjunkturmodell 1997-1 bis 1998-4, Nr. 45. (Bearbeiter: Dr.
György Barabas, Ullrich Taureg) Essen, 16. Juni 1997.
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (Hrsg.): Vierteljährliche Pro-
gnose mit dem RWI-Konjunkturmodell 1998-1 bis 1999-4, Nr. 47. (Bearbeiter: Dr.
György Barabas, Ullrich Taureg) Essen, 2. Juli 1998.
Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung: Jah-
resgutachten 1996/97. (BT-Drucksache 13/6200) Bonn 1996.
Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung: Jah-
resgutachten 1997/98. (BT-Drucksache 13/9090) Bonn 1997.
Sapir, M.: Review of economic forecasts for the transition period. (Studies in Income
and Wealth, 11.) New York, NY 1949, pp. 271ff.
- 23 -
RWI – Heilemann\Hannover\Hannover.doc – 14.12.99
Seidler, H.: Das für die Konjunkturdiagnose von den Instituten angewandte Verfahren.
In: G. Fürst (Hrsg.), Konjunktur-Indikatoren. (Sonderheft zum AStA, 7.) Göttingen
u.a. 1975, pp. 101-114.
Stäglin, R.: Beitrag der Wirtschaftsforschungsinstitute zur kurzfristigen Wirtschaftsbe-
obachtung. AStA, Bd. 82 (1998), pp. 66-80.
Thomas, R.L.: Introductory econometrics - Theory and Application. London 1995.
Wallis, K.F. (ed.): Models of the U.K. economy. A second review by the ESRC
Macroeconomic Modelling Bureau. Oxford 1985.
Zarnowitz, V.: Business cycles - theory, history, indicators, and forecasting. (NBER Stu-
dies in Business Cycles, 27.) Chicago 1992.
- 24 -
RWI – Heilemann\Hannover\Hannover.doc – 14.12.99
Appendix
-
25
 -
Η
α
ν
ν
ο
ϖ
ερ
∴
Τα
βλ
ε 
6 
−
 
14
.
12
.9
9
Ta
bl
e 
6
C
yc
lic
a
l c
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n
 
o
f t
he
 
fo
re
ca
st
s
cl
as
sif
ic
at
io
n
3
Fo
re
ca
st
1
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y2
19
96
19
97
3
4
1
2
3
4
Ph
as
e
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
Ph
as
e
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
Ph
as
e
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
Ph
as
e
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
Ph
as
e
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
Ph
as
e
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
A
a
do
w
n
0,
48
1
u
p
0,
96
8
u
p
0,
95
3
u
p
0,
96
9
u
p
0,
69
1
u
p
0,
96
7
b
u
p
0,
33
1
ltp
0,
02
7
ltp
0,
03
7
ltp
0,
02
2
ltp
0,
18
8
ltp
0,
02
3
B
a
do
w
n
0,
54
8
u
p
0,
92
9
u
p
0,
97
3
u
p
0,
98
7
u
p
0,
90
2
u
p
0,
99
1
b
u
p
0,
24
0
ltp
0,
06
1
ltp
0,
02
2
ltp
0,
01
0
ltp
0,
06
6
ltp
0,
00
6
C
a
u
p
0,
87
5
u
p
0,
96
3
u
p
0,
98
3
u
p
0,
97
7
u
p
0,
79
7
u
p
0,
94
5
b
ltp
0,
07
8
ltp
0,
03
3
ltp
0,
01
5
ltp
0,
01
8
ltp
0,
15
3
ltp
0,
04
5
D
a
u
p
0,
81
5
u
p
0,
91
4
u
p
0,
98
9
u
p
0,
98
9
u
p
0,
93
3
u
p
0,
81
5
b
ltp
0,
11
1
ltp
0,
07
6
ltp
0,
00
9
ltp
0,
00
9
ltp
0,
05
4
ltp
0,
01
1
E
a
u
p
0,
75
1
u
p
0,
84
3
u
p
0,
94
9
u
p
0,
97
3
u
p
0,
76
8
u
p
0,
89
6
b
ltp
0,
13
0
ltp
0,
13
8
ltp
0,
04
1
ltp
0,
02
2
ltp
0,
19
5
ltp
0,
02
9
F
a
u
p
0,
89
6
u
p
0,
81
8
u
p
0,
98
9
u
p
0,
99
5
u
p
0,
98
7
u
p
0,
99
7
b
ltp
0,
07
8
ltp
0,
14
7
ltp
0,
00
9
ltp
0,
00
4
ltp
0,
01
1
ltp
0,
00
3
G
a
u
p
0,
82
0
u
p
0,
95
1
u
p
0,
92
1
u
p
0,
98
0
u
p
0,
97
7
u
p
0,
98
1
b
ltp
0,
14
5
ltp
0,
04
2
ltp
0,
04
9
ltp
0,
01
7
ltp
0,
02
2
ltp
0,
01
4
A
u
th
or
‘
s 
co
m
pu
ta
tio
n
s 
an
d 
o
ffi
ci
al
 
da
ta
.
 
-
 
1) 
A
: 
Fo
re
ca
st
 
N
r.
 
43
; B
: 
o
ld
 
sa
m
pl
e 
pe
rio
d 
(19
86
-1
 
to
 1
99
5-
4),
 
n
ew
 
as
su
m
pt
io
n
s;
 
C:
 
n
ew
 
sa
m
pl
e 
pe
rio
d,
 
o
ld
 
as
su
m
pt
io
n
; 
D
: 
n
ew
sa
m
pl
e 
pe
rio
d,
 
n
ew
 
as
su
m
pt
io
n
s 
(F
o
re
ca
st
 
N
o
. 
44
); 
E:
 
lik
e 
D
 
w
ith
 re
v
ise
d 
as
su
m
pt
io
n
s;
 
 
F:
 
sa
m
pl
e 
pe
rio
d 
19
88
-1
 
to
 1
99
7-
4 
(F
o
re
ca
st
 
N
o
.
 
47
), 
re
v
ise
d 
as
su
m
pt
io
n
s;
 
G:
 
ac
tu
al
da
ta
 
(S
pr
in
g 
19
98
). 
-
 
2) 
a:
 
hi
gh
es
t 
pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y 
fo
r 
qu
ar
te
r 
to
 
be
 
cl
as
sif
ie
d 
in
 
th
e 
co
rr
es
po
nd
in
g 
ph
as
e;
 
b:
 
se
co
u
n
d 
hi
gh
es
t 
pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y.
 
-
 
3) 
do
w
n
: 
do
w
n
sw
in
g 
ph
as
e;
 
ltp
: 
lo
w
er
tu
rn
in
g 
po
in
t p
ha
se
; u
p:
 
u
ps
w
in
g 
ph
as
e;
 
(ut
p:
 
u
pp
er
 
tu
rn
in
g 
po
in
t p
ha
se
). F
o
r 
de
ta
ils
 
se
e 
H
ei
le
m
an
n
, 
M
ün
ch
 1
99
8.
